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Abstract 
The current crisis puts at issue the self-regulated market system of 
monitoring and control. Claims for restoring the proper functioning of 
market economies in general, and financial markets in particular, call for 
either establishing new sets of rules or creating new supervising authorities. 
Both claims rely on the received mantra of full independence that applies 
whenever control is concerned. However, our analysis pays attention to a 
neglected aspect of monitoring and control, which requires the capability to 
discovering and understanding flaws in and dangers from the inner 
congeries of the business affair under examination. Arguably, this business-
specific expertise and independence trade off. To overcome this problem, an 
optimal share of non-independent controllers may be chosen from or 
appointed by stakeholding constituencies of the business affair. They can 
provide proficient monitoring and control without colluding, in principle, 
with executive managers of the activity to be controlled. 
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Efficient monitoring and control in an intangible-driven economy: 
is full independence always required? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
According to the Group of Thirthy’s report (2009: 4), “the key issue posed 
by the present crisis is crystal clear: “How can we restore strong, 
competitive, innovative financial markets to support global economic 
growth without once again risking a breakdown in market functioning so 
severe as to put the world economies at risk?”. “Policymakers, central 
bankers, and financial regulators will necessarily remain focused on dealing 
with immediate threats to the effective functioning of markets. However, in 
taking what are in effect emergency measures, a consensus on the desirable 
and lasting elements of a reformed system can be useful, and even 
necessary, to speed restoration of confidence in sturdy, competitive, and 
efficient financial arrangements serving both national and international 
markets.”  
 
Generally speaking, two main directions of reform are suggested. On one 
side, some claim for bettering the rules of the market game among private 
actors; these rules should be especially concerned with watchdogs of the 
market playing field such as rating agencies, external auditors, boards of 
directors, and so on. On the other side, others argue for establishing a new 
supervising authority outside the market because they do not longer believe 
in the virtue of the “invisible hand” of markets that are increasingly fast-
moving, changing and globalised. Both proposals share a common 
objective: they aim restoring the proper functioning of market economies 
through the independence of their monitoring and control, obtained either by 
a large reform of the monitoring rules in the first case, or by the creation of 
a supervising authority whose independence is securitised “by definition” 
through governmental intervention. As a matter of fact, independence has 
been the “conventional wisdom” (Bhagat and Black, 1999) and the received 
answer since the 1970s, both by academic literature and regulators (at least 
in the US and in the UK), whenever monitoring and control are concerned. 
 
However, these received analyses of control magnify independence, 
arguably to the detriment of expertise and knowledge. Whatever 
accomplished by private actors or public authorities, the efficiency of 
control certainly relates to the distinctive characteristics of the underlying 
business affair under examination. Even though independence is surely of 
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value for the resulting performance of controlling bodies, the latter also 
need gathering relevant and reliable information in order to properly apply 
their vested authority in shaping the business they have in charge to control. 
Confronted with business activities that are increasingly driven by 
intangible resources (information and communication technologies; research 
and development; network and empowerment enhancement; workforce 
training and labour organisation improvements) an independent controller - 
who does not have any specific knowledge of the business - either provides 
a rather deceptive monitoring performance or needs to hire more and more 
external expert consultants and advisors. Accordingly, the claim for full 
independence surely takes advantages by increased independence, but pays 
the opportunity cost of lacking business-specific expertise and knowledge 
by appointed watchdogs. This may eventually lead to adverse consequences 
and inefficient results when the importance of intangible resources and 
activities increase. The board of directors of listed companies vividly 
illustrates our argument, with the common requirement of so-called 
‘supermajority board’ (that is, a board with more than 80% of independent 
members). We therefore focus on this particular monitoring agency, even if 
our argument extends to other bodies.  
 
Therefore, the acknowledged importance of intangible drivers of 
performance in developed economies requires a reconsideration of the 
mantra of independence for controlling bodies. Our analysis identifies the 
trade-off between independence and business-specific expertise. The 
existence of this trade-off recommends paying attention to the specific level 
of intangibles in business activities to be controlled in order to identify the 
correct mix between independence and specific expertise which securitises 
the optimal performance of control. This suggestion can be integrated by 
supporters of enhanced private watchdogs under reformed rules of the 
market game, and by supporters of new supervising authorities provided by 
the “visible hand” of governments as well. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The second section 
summarises two alternative solutions claimed for to overcome the current 
crisis. The third section identifies a common belief of both solutions: the 
mantra of required independence of control. The fourth section disentangles 
the needs of efficient control activity, which depend on the underlying 
characteristics of the business, especially the relative significance of 
intangible resources and activities. This approach questions that full 
independence is always the most efficient solution for every business affair, 
 4
since intangible drivers of performance may require business-specific 
expertise that arguable trades-off with independence. The fifth section 
analyses how this trade-off works in determining the overall efficiency of 
monitoring and control. The sixth section draws two main implications of 
this analysis, namely for the composition of boards of control and for the 
related informational devices they deal with. The seventh section concludes. 
  
 
2. The market crisis as the failure of “market watchdogs” 
 
This section briefly summarises the two alternative positions on the suitable 
institutional reforms currently required by market economies in general and 
by financial markets in particular. Both proposals, we claim, rely on the 
critical notion of independence of boards of control.  
 
The recent crisis points to a general deficiency of self-regulated markets in 
general, and of financial markets in particular. A broad consensus is 
emerging among academics, practitioners and policymakers about the 
proved inefficiency of the received set of rules and supervising agencies that 
were expected to prevent and counter-act market failures and shortcomings. 
Why institutional watchdogs such as rating agencies, supervising 
authorities, boards of directors individually and collectively fail to alert and 
rescue the financial and economic systems? Why the “invisible hand” of the 
market did not play the right game and spontaneously override the systemic 
crisis? Given the present conditions of complexity and globalisation of 
business affairs, is still the market efficiently regulated by the timely and 
effective reaction of its self-regulatory devices? 
 
Generally speaking, two main answers to these critical issues are claimed 
for. On one side, some stress the fraudulent misconduct of individuals 
appointed as controllers and supervisors, driven by their unbounded avidity 
and clever manipulations in absence of a unique set of rules for the market 
game in the global field. On the other side, others claim for the incapacity of 
the market to cope with new economic and financial conditions that go 
beyond the realm of the old-fashioned “invisible hand”. Let summarise both 
answers in some details. 
  
First answer: Bettering the rules of monitoring and control, especially by 
establishing a unique system worldwide based on the “independence” of 
private controllers within the market field. 
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High profile scandals and frauds prove that the deceptive performance of 
controllers can be associated with fraudulent conducts, clearly facilitated by 
their non independence, that is, their eventual collusion with entrenched 
management. Enron, WorldCom, Maxwell, Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI), Versailles Group, Parmalat, Madoff and Satyam are 
clear examples in which the frauds were an insider affair. Concerning the 
latter, the Guardian reports: “It complied with the latest accounting 
standards and boasted audit committees, independent directors and a global 
accounting firm as its auditor […] India has embraced western ideas on 
corporate accountability, possibly to comfort foreign investors. All the 
conditions associated with failed audits in the western world are present. 
Auditors were selected by directors and paid by Satyam. They also acted as 
consultants to the company. Their fee dependency on corporate clients 
makes them susceptible to pressures to go along with directors”1. A number 
of watchdogs’ fraudulent misconducts may be listed: KPMG was hammered 
for its audit of Xerox; Deloitte, Touche and Tohmatsu was fined $50m for 
audit failures at Adelphia; Ernst & Young was prosecuted by the Securities 
& Exchange Commission (SEC) for persistent violations of auditor 
independence rules; and so on. All these cases show collusion of interests 
among business insiders. They formally played different roles in the 
business affair, but actually shared a joint fraudulent behaviour that 
irresponsibly ignored the broader consequences of respective actions. As an 
answer, a unique set of monitoring rules worldwide is then claimed for 
restabilising the independence of those watchdogs and reboot the proper 
functioning of the market that was seriously damaged by these frauds. 
 
However, contrary to those cases of frauds, audit committees and boards of 
directors having in change the control of Lehman Brothers and Enron 
formally complied with all the formal rules of independence. Nevertheless, 
they factually did not provide timely and effective alerts and counter-actions 
against disruptive practices that eventually led to destroy the businesses 
under their control. This suggests that independence does not prevent 
control failures, or may even favour such failures. The argument is 
developed in section 4. 
 
The market failures and shortcomings, others argue, may then require the 
intervention of governments to cope with them. This is the second answer to 
the crisis of control. 
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Second answer: The self-regulation of the market is out of date, and 
unreliable. The solution is to create an independent supervising authority 
that governments should have in charge.  
This answer puts at issue the coexistence of private actors managing the 
business with private actors having in charge to control them. If controllers 
are privately connected to the activity under examination, some claim, then 
they will be framed by the same fragility and inadequacy that the market has 
currently experienced. Therefore, the urgent provisions taken by 
policymakers to “fixing” global finance in the last months should become 
structural. One of the most claimed solutions is to establish supervising 
authority that watches the watchdogs, according to the Gordon Brown’s idea 
of a “college of supervisors” expected to oversee the biggest financial 
firms.2  
 
However, “governments broadly welcome the benefits of global finance, yet 
they are not prepared to set up either a global financial regulator, which 
would interfere deep inside their markets, or a global lender of last resort. 
Instead, regulated financial firms are overseen by disparate national 
supervisors”3. This uncomfortable situation casts doubts on the super-
authority proposal, because supervising authorities may always meddle with 
dispraising a leading global player such a national important bank or a flag-
carrying airline. If private actors can be over-optimistic in judging 
companies, “imagine how much more so governments would be about their 
national treasures”4. American regulatory authorities such as the FED and 
the SEC are increasingly criticised for having accommodated innovative but 
over-risky practices that eventually proved to be disruptive for the financial 
system worldwide.5 During the Hearings of the Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, Alain Greenspan quite clearly admitted flaws and 
shortcomings in the regulatory actions the FED has made before the crisis.6 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Two solutions, one preconception: independence 
 
Let us resume the two advocated solutions. The first proposal is to amend 
and reinforce the set of rules that frames the functioning of the market 
through independent controllers of private businesses. Under this new set of 
monitoring rules, the market may properly function, some claim. On the 
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contrary, the second proposal consists in reinforcing the normal functioning 
of the market, which proved not to be able to survive alone, by establishing 
independent supervising authorities having in charge the monitoring and 
control of market operations.  
Both the proposals acknowledge the need to restore confidence and reboot 
the proper functioning of market economies in general and of financial 
markets in particular. In parallel, they increasingly recognise that market 
economies and the financial markets have been transformed with respect to 
the past. They have been reshaped by innovative products and activities 
fostered by intricate economic organisation of transnational enterprise 
affairs. Consequently, it results harder and harder to understand the actual 
and potential value of each business activity. The traditional modes of 
monitoring and control appear to be inadequate. This is the very motivation 
behind either the quest of new rules for traditional watchdogs in the first 
case, and the creation of new supervising authorities in the second case.  
 
In our opinion, rightly address the overwhelming problem of monitoring and 
control of business affairs requires to clearly disentangling what the 
controlling activity implies. In the broadest sense, control means the 
gathering of information in order to exercise vested authority so as to shape 
the activity of the controlled entity, including by informing its 
constituencies or stakeholders. As such, independence makes sure that, once 
aware of flaws and dangers, the controller will “do the right thing to do” by 
counter-acting the crisis and keeping informed the related parties. This is 
why rating agencies are required to be “independent” from companies that 
must be ranked by them, and directors of a company are required to be 
“independent” from the management of that company. In both cases, 
independence aims to cut the ties that link controllers to the controlled 
activity, putting them at a distance from the ongoing functioning of that 
activity. 
 
The board of directors represents one of the most conspicuous illustrations 
of this idea of independence. As noted by Cunningham (2008), it is by now 
usual to answer to corporate crisis by looking to independent directors, 
where independence is defined or proxied through a set of well-defined, 
objective criteria (de jure independence). Generally speaking, independence 
is compromised if the director of a company is (or has been) a corporate 
executive of that company or of its affiliates, is (or has been) employed by 
that company or by its affiliates, is employed as an executive of another 
company where any of that company’s executives sit on the board, is a 
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dominant shareholder of that company, has a significant business 
relationship with that company or its affiliates (including advisory or 
consulting services), is a close family member of an executive7 . The 
Sarbanes Oxley Act, passed in 2002, is no exception, requiring that audit 
committee be comprised solely of independent members. The objective is 
clear: de jure independence should help to limit conflict of interests, thus 
increasing the expected performance of directors in their monitoring 
activity. In the case of auditing, independence should guarantee that the 
decision not to certify biased information is made without collusion or 
delay.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Is independence the most appropriate solution in every case? 
 
In a sense, this approach based on independence alone neglects or 
subordinates expertise. Yet some recent evolutions claim for a more 
balanced diagnose in the case of directors: expertise is increasingly 
recognized as an important attribute for board members, especially for the 
audit committee (Cunningham, 2008). Contrary to the rules regarding 
independence, which followed the usual trail, the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(2002) introduced a path-breaking provision by requiring that all audit 
committee members have financial literacy and that at least one person be a 
financial expert (sec. 407)8. The idea is intuitive: generic expertise in 
accounting and finance, acquired through education or professional activity, 
may increase the effectiveness and reliability of auditing and then improve 
the overall quality of monitoring and control. In addition, we argue that, for 
some drivers of performance and some business models, efficient control 
may require business-specific, rather than generic, expertise. This business-
specific proficiency by controllers will be required especially when 
intangible resources are an important driver of performance and stakes of 
the business affair to be controlled.  
 
Intangibles have been the object of growing interest among scholars for the 
last two decades. Macroeconomists increasingly recognise that growth relies 
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as much on the contribution of intangible resources as on that of tangible 
ones9. In microeconomics10, it is now widely recognized that successful 
business models primarily involve investments in intangible, knowledge-
based, resources (Foray, 2004). Generally speaking, the following 
expenditures are considered to nurture the development and maintenance of 
such intangibles: (i) spending on information and communication 
technologies (hardware, telecommunication infrastructure and software); (ii) 
spending on Research and Development (R&D, scientific and non 
scientific) and patents; (iii) spending on development and maintenance of 
brands and trademarks (e.g. advertising); (iv) spending on workforce 
training in firm-specific capabilities and improvements in labour 
organization (total quality management, job rotation, just-in-time, team 
working, and so on). The various definitions of intangibles that have been 
proposed share at least one common point. They insist that intangibles are 
non-physical (they lack any material support), non-financial (they do not 
provide any legally-enclosed revenue) and provide relevant future benefits 
(Kim, 2007). This eventually implies that efficient market pricing scarcely 
applies or exists for intangibles, and other firm-specific modes of 
information and control result to be required for them.  
 
 
5 The trade-off between independence and firm-specific expertise 
 
The focus on independence alone misses an important part of the control 
activity, since efficient control also entails the ability to gather proper 
information, which allows to timely and effectively understand the specifics 
of a (more or less) complex and innovative business. This is especially true 
when intangibles are involved. The issue is then that this form of specific 
expertise is arguably negatively correlated to independence as it is 
commonly defined and appreciated11. As a consequence, focus on 
independence alone may have had and still have adverse consequences, by 
reducing the ability of the controlling board to collectively discover and 
properly react to flaws and dangers encountered by every innovative and 
changing business affair driven by intangibles.  
To some extent, our analysis may bring some light to a long-standing and 
puzzling empirical evidence: independence has a negligible or negative 
effect on firm performance (see e.g. Klein, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand 
and Johnson, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 1999; Klein, Shapiro and Young, 
2005). We argue that the requirement of full independence is to the 
detriment of specific expertise and knowledge. Whatever accomplished by 
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private actors or public authorities, the efficiency of control relates to the 
distinctive characteristics of the underlying business under examination. 
Even though independence is surely of value for the resulting performance 
of control, controlling bodies also need to gather relevant and reliable 
information in order to properly shape the business affair they have in 
charge to control. Confronted with business activities that are increasingly 
driven by intangibles resources (information and communication 
technologies; research and development; network and empowerment 
enhancement; workforce training and labour organisation improvements) an 
independent controller - who does not have any specific knowledge of the 
business - either provides a rather deceptive monitoring performance or 
needs to hire more and more external expert consultants and advisors. 
Accordingly, the claim for full independence surely takes advantages by 
increased independence, but pays the opportunity cost of a significant lack 
of business-specific expertise and knowledge by appointed watchdogs. This 
may eventually lead to adverse consequences and inefficient results when 
the importance of intangibles resources and activities increases. 
In sum, business-specific expertise and knowledge is expected to trade-off 
with de jure independence. In particular, our analysis suggests that the 
optimal level of independence for intangible-intensive business firms is 
lower, other things being equal, than for mature and stable ones. Put 
differently, we argue that there is a negative correlation between the level of 
intangibles and the optimal share of (de jure) independent members in 
controlling bodies such as the board of directors. 
 
To understand better how this trade-off between independency and specific 
expertise runs, let assume that the firm to be controlled is a “traditional” 
firm. In this case, the level of intangible resources is relatively low. 
Therefore, the most efficient control is assured by independent directors. Let 
now assume that the same firm starts to invest in new business activities that 
require expenditures in intangible resources. Those independent directors 
strive then to ensure the same level of monitoring. To do it, they need to hire 
some consultants and advisors which can help them to understand and 
explain all the intricacies of the changing business that independent 
supervisors – being extraneous to the firm – are unable to appreciate. Hiring 
advisors surely surrogates specific knowledge but also involves new 
monetary costs which increase with the level of intangible resources and 
activities driving the business. More “innovative” the firm is, higher are 
these costs. If we attribute a monetary benefit to the degree of independence 
by the supervisors – value that is, by definition, at its maximum amount for 
 11
a traditional firm-, then the increasing level of intangible resources implies a 
decreasing of the monetary value of the independence, because of the rising 
cost of hiring consultants and advisors. This fall in the net value provided by 
independence is a clear-cut representation of what we mean for trading-off 
independence and specific expertise. For some level of intangibles involved 
in the business, the recourse to another advisory report eventually results too 
costly and it becomes then more convenient - for whichever stakeholder 
being a claimant on the net value of the joint affair, including shareholders - 
to directly appoint a trustworthy expert to the Board of control. Therefore, 
when the level of intangible resources increases, a mixed board of 
supervisors becomes preferable, that is, a board that comprises independent 
and non-independent, proficient supervisors. The optimal share of non-
independent experts increases with the level of intangibles involved in the 
joint affair. 
 
 
6. Summing-up and further implications for controlling board 
composition and accounting systems 
 
Our analysis concerns the system of monitoring and control that is expected 
to discover and counter-act flaws and dangers involved by ongoing business 
operations. This system of “watchdog-ing” appears to be suitable from the 
viewpoint of private actors and for the public interest as well. Recent crisis 
and shortcomings put at issue the received system. Many claim that these 
market failures relates to the ties between supervisors and the object under 
their supervision. In parallel, they recognise the supervisors’ inability to 
properly discover and understand incoming troubles from business affairs 
that are increasingly innovative, complex and changing.  
 
One claimed solution suggests to bettering the monitoring rules in order to 
provide the market watchdogs with new and more adequate instruments to 
protect market against fraudulent behaviours and abuses. Another claimed 
solutions suggests to introducing a new kind of supervising authority, 
external to the market, under the responsibility of governments, and thus 
able to regulate the proper functioning of the market economy. Both 
solutions have the same common objective: restore the proper functioning 
of the market operations. Both solutions share the same fundamental 
preconception: the independence of control. Independence is provided by 
the new set of monitoring rules according to the first solution, and by the 
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supervising authority that is supposed to be “independent by definition” 
according to the second solution.  
 
Our analysis relates the efficiency of control to the underlying 
characteristics of the business affair to be controlled. A clear example is 
here the increasing role of the so-called ‘intangible’ resources in driving 
business performance and stakes. In the case of the most innovative firms, a 
significant part of overall strategic policies, involving investments in 
technologies, innovation, networks and training, may be understood and 
appreciated only by experts having a direct connection with the specifics of 
that business in situation through time. Arguably, this firm-specific 
expertise (fundamental to a practical knowledge of those firms where 
intangible resources are significant) trades-off with de jure independence 
(usually advocated as securitization for fair monitoring and control). 
 
Because many markets, including financial markets, are nowadays 
increasingly driven by intangibles resources and activities, boards of control 
increasingly need to discover and appreciate the performance potential of 
these “intangible” resources. Unfortunately, efficient market pricing often 
lack for those resources that belong to the inner congeries of business 
affairs. Accordingly, policymakers and investors may benefit from a board 
design more shaped by firm-specific expertise to the detriment of de jure 
independence. Finally, we argue that efficient monitoring and control may 
require independence, generic expertise in accounting and finance, but also 
firm-specific expertise. Given the fact that de jure independence and firm-
specific expertise trade-off, and the contextual presence of significant 
intangible drivers of performance (and stakes), there should exist an optimal 
share of independent controllers, relative to the core characteristics of each 
business model or industry. 
 
Our analysis implies that any claim for full independence of control 
eventually results to be reductive, for it neglects an essential part of the 
control activity. Control issues necessarily imply to penetrate the “black 
box” of each business, by recognising stakeholders and their dynamic 
degree of involvement to the joint affair through time, as well as the 
evolving relationships existing between these different constituencies. 
Therefore, efficient not-independent controllers - having distinctive specific 
knowledge - may come from or be appointed by the respective 
constituencies: this choice may couple variety of interests (relative to 
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executive management and other insiders) with required capabilities in 
understanding the specifics of ongoing business processes to be controlled.   
 
The case of the board of directors of a company may illustrate this claim. 
On the one hand, ‘super-majority’ boards appear to be attractive devices in 
very limited cases – contrary to what is usually called for12. On the other 
hand, “grey” or “affiliate” directors (that is directors that do not meet the 
standard criteria of independence while not being member of the firm’s 
upper management) may enhance the overall quality of control, including 
auditing and disclosure. This latter category includes agents performing 
expert services to the company. But it also includes worker representatives, 
as they are provided for public companies by virtue of (corporate or labour) 
law in more than 10 EU member States13.  
 
A further implication concerns the informational flow that the board of 
control deals with, and the regulation of the informational devices involved 
in this flow. The working of a mixed board (comprising independent and 
non-independent, proficient members) may be facilitated by adjusting these 
informational devices accordingly. These committees are expected to 
supervise business affairs that are factually driven by (tangible) resources 
that are priced by active markets, and (intangible) resources that factually 
are not. The relevant information set is then composed by market-driven and 
firm-specific information. This muddles every tentative to rely only on 
market-driven information to gather a proper representation of the business 
affair. The current failure of marked-to-market accounting (or fair value 
accounting) is then the failure of an accounting system that purported to 
neglect the firm-specific side of monitoring and control (Bignon, Biondi, 
and Ragot 2004),14 as full independence did. According to OECD (2006, 
p.7): “traditional accounting has necessarily remained focused on tangible 
assets. Traditionally, the only intangible assets recognized in financial 
statements have been intellectual property, such as patents and trademarks 
where a market value has been established by a transaction, and acquired 
items such as goodwill. Although accounting standards can probably be 
developed further to take into account a wider range of intangibles, clear 
limits are set by the difficulty of establishing monetary values (valuation) 
that are at the same time consistent across firms, verifiable and that cannot 
be easily manipulated. As a result, a significant portion of corporate assets 
go under-reported in the financial accounts. The relative lack of accounting 
recognition of intangibles coupled with their growing importance in the 
value creation process means that the financial statements have lost some of 
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their value for shareholders. If other information does not fill the void, there 
could be misallocation of resources in capital markets.” 
A market focus is then inappropriate for accounting systems that are 
increasingly confronted with intangible resources that are fundamental 
drivers of performance and stakes. Alternative accounting systems should 
look for a proper representation of the specifics of the inner congeries of 
ongoing business firms. From this perspective, improvements on historical 
cost accounting systems may be promising, for historical costs have the 
main cognitive advantage of being  fixed – usually, at least – by actual 
transactions that can be tracked through time and are easier to be monitored 
and audited (ref. to Biondi and Rebérioux 2008 for further details). A mixed 
board is expected to be able to provide trustworthy certification for this 
historical disclosure of generated performance and entrepreneurial stakes. 
 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, the suggested approach to identify the optimal composition of 
boards of control is significant for at least three different reasons:  
 
(1) If we impose de jure independence without taking in account the very 
object of monitoring, we treat all firms as “traditional” ones. In this way, the 
more innovative firms will be submitted to a deceptive mode of control 
(accomplished by independent but ignorant controllers) with inefficiently 
high costs of monitoring (involved by excessive hiring of consultants and 
advisors). The same inefficiency is expected to emerge if full independence 
is applied to the supervising authority established by governments. More is 
the distance (in knowledge’s terms) between the supervisor and the object to 
be supervised, less is its capacity to timely and effectively appreciate 
innovative activities and related stakes. 
 
(2) A similar problem derives from the impossibility of an independent 
supervisor to keep the cognitive contact with the dynamic evolution of 
business strategies that imply expenditures in intangibles under increased 
levels of innovation. Again, a mixed board of control - jointly composed by 
independent and non-independent, proficient members - is expected to 
increase the overall performance of the system of monitoring and control.  
 
(3) By recognising the relationship between the level of intangibles and the 
optimal composition of the board of control, we can also bettering the 
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trustworthiness of the disclosure of information from the viewpoint of the 
final “users” of this disclosure. A de jure independent board of control will 
focus its attention only on the traditional value of a firm. It will adopt a 
static appreciation of the firm that cannot integrate but the instantaneous 
(and partial) contribution from tangible resources. This approach results in 
appreciating the value potential of business policies only on their short-term. 
It would be optimal only if the final user of the disclosure is a trading 
investor interested in temporarily placements or a regulatory body that is 
only interested in day-by-day market-clearing stability. On the contrary, if 
the final user of the disclosure is interested in longer-term entrepreneurial 
strategies related to the development of the business through historical time 
- these strategies being generally correlated to increasing expenditures in 
intangibles resources and activities - a significant quota of the board having 
in charge the auditing and disclosure of trustworthy information should be 
composed by non independent, proficient members. Such users may be 
business investors looking for business partnerships and mergers, long-run 
venture capitalists, and regulatory bodies committed to the innovation 
potential of businesses for local economies and the eventual resilience of 
market economies through time. 
 
Finally, every business affair that is object of monitoring corresponds with 
an optimal mix of specific expertise and de jure independence, from the 
perspective of efficient control. Such optimal combination is not only 
influenced by the current state of intangible resources (static analysis) but 
also by their evolution and change (dynamic analysis). This eventually calls 
for an appropriate share of non-independent controllers coming from or 
being appointed by the constituencies of the business affair to be controlled, 
coupled with an accounting system focusing on the inner congeries of the 
enterprise entity through historical time. 
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